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Populist politicians are often associated with the successful 
use of social networking sites (SNS). First, research shows 
that SNS—particularly Facebook—are well-suited channels 
for distributing populist messages (e.g., Ernst et al., 2017; 
Groshek & Engelbert, 2012; Stier et al., 2017). Second, 
studies demonstrate that citizens with high populist attitudes 
are more likely to use Facebook to obtain political informa-
tion (Groshek & Koc-Michalska, 2017; Schulz, 2018). 
Finally, initial research indicates that populist actors and 
populist messages are both drivers of user reactions on 
Facebook (Blassnig et al., 2020; Bobba, 2019). However, so 
far, studies on the relationship between populist communi-
cation and user reactions on SNS have relied exclusively on 
quantitative content analyses of digital trace data and have 
therefore largely focused on the supply-side of populist 
communication.
Taking a demand-side perspective, one may assume that 
reactions to populist messages on SNS are influenced by 
the characteristics of the message, the sender, and the recip-
ient. On the one hand, existing research demonstrates that 
the effects of populist communication are moderated by 
recipients’ preexisting populist attitudes (Hameleers, Bos, 
& de Vreese, 2018; Müller et al., 2017). Findings by Müller 
et al. (2017) show that exposure to populist messages 
reinforces both prior agreement and disagreement with 
populist ideas. It is therefore reasonable to assume that 
prior populist attitudes may moderate whether a recipient 
likes, shares, or comments a post with a populist message 
or by a populist politician. On the other hand, experimental 
studies suggest that the source of the message may influ-
ence the effect of populist messages in Facebook posts 
(Hameleers & Schmuck, 2017). However, it is still unclear 
whether and how these two factors—populist messages and 
populist actors as the senders of messages—interact. Do 
populist actors activate a corresponding schema—a “popu-
lism schema”—that increases the perception of populist 
elements (i.e., anti-elitism, people-centrism, and popular 
sovereignty) in their messages?
To address this research gap, this study analyzes the effect 
of populist communication on user reactions using an online 
survey experiment. Thereby, it adds to the existing literature 
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with a twofold contribution. First, by following a 2 × 2 design 
(N = 647) and by manipulating populist versus nonpopulist 
messages in a Facebook post and a typically populist versus a 
mainstream politician as the source, the study allows us to 
investigate how populist messages and populist actors inter-
act and how both components foster user reactions. We 
assume that a populist actor as the source of a message acti-
vates a populism schema, which increases the perception of a 
message as being populist. Second, this study complements 
existing content analyses on populism and user reactions by 
analyzing not only the effect of populist communication on 
user reactions but also how the effect is moderated by recipi-
ents’ populist attitudes.
Popularity on SNS
SNS have become a very important channel for political 
actors to communicate with their constituencies. On the 
one hand, SNS provide a platform where messages can be 
sent directly to a large audience of like-minded supporters 
while circumventing the media (Ernst et al., 2017). On the 
other hand, messages on SNS are not only distributed to 
the primary audience following the sender of the message 
but also to a secondary audience; when individuals like, 
share, or comment on a message, the content becomes vis-
ible to their followers or friends as well (Vaccari & 
Valeriani, 2015). This two-step flow of communication 
(Katz, 1957) follows a genuine logic in the online world, 
which has been referred to as “privileging popularity” 
(Webster, 2011, p. 54). This means that popular content is 
privileged over unpopular content both by the sender of a 
message, who seeks to promote content that resonates with 
the audience, and by the audience, which uses popularity 
as a selection criterion given the multitude of information 
online (Porten-Cheé et al., 2018).
In light of the importance of popularity for the distribu-
tion of content on SNS, a growing body of research has 
evolved around the concept of popularity cues. The term 
refers to user reactions such as likes or shares of content on 
SNS (Porten-Cheé et al., 2018). Recent research has identi-
fied several characteristics that drive popularity online, 
including the newsworthiness of content (Trilling et al., 
2016), emotionality (Bene, 2017a; Berger & Milkman, 
2012; Dang-Xuan et al., 2013; Heiss et al., 2019; Keller & 
Kleinen-von Königslöw, 2018), the presence of populist 
claims (Blassnig et al., 2020; Bobba, 2019), and character-
istics of the source of the message (Blassnig et al., 2020; 
Bobba, 2019; Heiss et al., 2019; Keller & Kleinen-von 
Königslöw, 2018). These findings suggest that posts by 
populist actors perform particularly well with regard to 
online popularity. Both populist communication and popu-
list leaders have been identified as drivers of user reactions. 
In the following section, we will therefore have a closer 
look at populist communication and its potential effects on 
user engagement.
Populist Communication and Its Effects
Populism can be conceived of as a “set of ideas” (Hawkins & 
Kaltwasser, 2018) or as a “thin” ideology that sees society 
divided into two antagonistic groups, the pure people and the 
corrupt elite, and that postulates that politics should be an 
expression of the people’s will (Mudde, 2004). This ideology 
manifests as the expression of populist ideas in the form of 
populist communication (de Vreese et al., 2018; Wirth et al., 
2016). Populist communication is characterized by messages 
blaming or discrediting the elite (anti-elitism), praising or 
approaching the people (people-centrism), and statements 
demanding more power for the people (people’s sovereignty) 
(Wirth et al., 2016).
From a communication-centered perspective (Stanyer 
et al., 2017), a politician becomes populist by communicat-
ing populist messages to the public. This implies that, first, 
any politician across the political spectrum may use populist 
communication and that, second, politicians can be populist 
to different degrees depending on the extent to which they 
send populist messages. In contrast, research following an 
actor-centered approach defines specific parties or politi-
cians as a priori populist (Stanyer et al., 2017). Various stud-
ies have compiled categorizations identifying populist actors 
(see, for example, Rooduijn et al., 2019). Empirical research 
indicates that members of these typically populist parties use 
populist communication to a larger extent than members of 
nonpopulist parties (Ernst et al., 2019).
On the demand-side, populism manifests in the form of 
populist attitudes that can be defined as the degree of agree-
ment with a populist ideology at the individual level 
(Akkerman et al., 2014; Schulz, Müller, et al., 2018). 
Accordingly, someone with high populist attitudes has a neg-
ative attitude toward the elite (anti-elitism), perceives the 
people as homogeneous and virtuous (people-centrism), and 
supports the demand that the people should be granted more 
power (people’s sovereignty) (Schulz, Müller, et al., 2018). 
These populist attitudes are relatively stable and operate as a 
latent demand or a disposition that can be made salient by 
specific contexts or contents (Hawkins & Kaltwasser, 2018).
Activation of a Populism Schema
Populist attitudes can also be conceived of as a cognitive 
schema—a “populism schema” (Krämer, 2014). Schema 
theory suggests that human cognition is organized in the 
form of relational topic clusters. Accordingly, schemata can 
be described as domain-specific relational clusters or mental 
structures that organize our memory and influence the 
human perception and processing of new information 
(Bartlett & Burt, 1933; Brewer & Nakamura, 1984; Iran-
Nejad, 1984). A “populism schema,” thus, describes a rela-
tional cognitive cluster related to the core ideas of populist 
ideology (i.e., anti-elitism, people-centrism, and popular 
sovereignty). This cognitive schema may be activated by 
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populist communication. Consequently, we may assume 
that populist posts by politicians on SNS have priming 
effects (Roskos-Ewoldsen et al., 2002), increasing the 
(short-term) accessibility of a populist cognitive schema in 
the memory of recipients. Hence, populist communication 
activates preexisting populist attitudes by making them 
more salient. According to schema theory, highlighting one 
element of a cognitive cluster is often sufficient to coacti-
vate other elements of the cognitive cluster (Bartlett & Burt, 
1933; Brewer & Nakamura, 1984; Iran-Nejad, 1984). 
Messages that contain one dimension of populist communi-
cation may also make other dimensions more salient and 
activate a populist schema in total (Müller et al., 2017). 
Following this argument, one can assume that actors who 
are typically associated with populist ideas or known for 
populist communication may similarly activate a populism 
schema. The activation of such a schema may increase the 
salience of populist attitudes and bias message processing 
toward schema-congruent elements (Galambos et al., 1986; 
Lodge & Hamill, 1986). Specifically, on SNS, where politi-
cal actors send out messages with a high frequency, the 
image of a politician as populist and their overall extent of 
populist communication may have a spillover effect on mes-
sages that do not contain any populist elements. There is 
initial evidence that the source of a message influences the 
effect of populist messages communicated via SNS: 
Hameleers and Schmuck (2017) show in an experiment that 
populist Facebook messages only reinforce citizens’ popu-
list attitudes for those who support the source of the mes-
sage. However, the interaction of populist (vs. nonpopulist) 
messages and populist (vs. nonpopulist) actors as the source 
of a message has not yet been investigated. This leads to our 
first hypothesis:
H1. A Facebook post will be perceived as more populist if 
the sender is a typically populist actor compared to a typi-
cally nonpopulist actor, regardless of whether it contains 
populist messages.
Effects on User Reactions
Experiments have shown that populist messages reinforce 
populist attitudes but only for people who identify with pop-
ulist politicians or citizens (Hameleers & Schmuck, 2017) or 
who have a higher feeling of relative deprivation (Hameleers, 
Bos, & de Vreese, 2018). Measuring long-term exposure to 
populist communication based on content analysis and panel 
survey data, Müller et al. (2017) show that exposure to popu-
list messages in the news increases populist attitudes but 
only for those citizens who already had higher populist atti-
tudes beforehand. For citizens with low populist attitudes, 
exposure to populist communication leads to a lower agree-
ment with populist ideas. These findings provide support for 
the theoretical assumption that populist communication 
makes mainly preexisting populist attitudes more salient and 
suggest that these prior populist attitudes act as a moderator 
of the effects of populist communication. The argument that 
exposure to information that confirms recipients’ preexisting 
beliefs reaffirms those beliefs, whereas exposure to informa-
tion that challenges preexisting beliefs leads to a rejection of 
that information and a doubling-down on those beliefs does 
not apply exclusively to populist attitudes. It can also be 
linked to broader concepts such as motivated reasoning 
(Kunda, 1990), confirmation bias (Klapper, 1960), or atti-
tude polarization (Knobloch-Westerwick & Meng, 2009).
In addition to attitudinal effects, research has also investi-
gated the effects of populist communication on behavioral 
outcomes or intentions. Findings by Hameleers, Bos, Fawzi, 
et al. (2018) indicate that the combination of people-centrist 
and anti-elitist messages increases the likelihood that people 
will become politically engaged. From a theoretical perspec-
tive, this can be explained based on social identity theory 
(Tajfel & Turner, 2004), according to which populist com-
munication invokes specific in-group and out-group identi-
ties (Hameleers et al., 2017b; Hawkins & Kaltwasser, 2018; 
Schulz, Wirth, & Müller, 2018). The perception of the people 
as a deprived in-group and the elites as an out-group threat 
may have a mobilizing effect on people and trigger collective 
action (Hameleers, Bos, Fawzi, et al., 2018; Simon & 
Klandermans, 2001; van Zomeren et al., 2008). Furthermore, 
studies have started to investigate the effects of populist 
communication in social media posts on citizens’ reactions 
based on digital trace data. Initial empirical evidence sug-
gests that populist communication leads to more user reac-
tions in reaction to politicians’ Facebook posts (Blassnig 
et al., 2020; Bobba, 2019), as well as to more reader com-
ments and more populist reader comments in response to 
online news articles (Blassnig et al., 2019). The results by 
Blassnig et al. (2020) further suggest that populist leaders 
receive more user reactions overall on Facebook and Twitter 
than mainstream political leaders. However, these studies 
were based on content analyses and therefore cannot control 
for recipients’ sociodemographic characteristics, political 
orientation, or populist attitudes. Building on research on 
the effects of populist communication, we expect that the 
populist attitudes of recipients will act as a moderator. First, 
we expect that mainly those recipients who agree with popu-
list ideas will be mobilized into collective action by such 
messages. Second, since user reactions on Facebook—
specifically likes and shares that are the most common 
reactions—can be mainly interpreted as positive reactions 
toward a message (Porten-Cheé et al., 2018), we assume that 
recipients are more likely to react to a Facebook post by a 
populist politician and/or a post containing populist mes-
sages if they have high populist attitudes. This leads to the 
following hypotheses:
H2a. Recipients are more likely to react to a Facebook 
post containing populist messages than to a nonpopulist 
Facebook post.
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H2b. Recipients with higher populist attitudes are more 
likely to react to a Facebook post containing populist 
messages than recipients with lower populist attitudes.
H3a. Recipients are more likely to react to a Facebook 
post by a typically populist politician than by a main-
stream politician.
H3b. Recipients with higher populist attitudes are more 
likely to react to Facebook posts by a typically populist 
politician than recipients with lower populist attitudes.
Thus far, content analyses have shown that both populist 
messages and populist actors are separate predictors of user 
reactions. Since we assume that populist messages and typi-
cally populist politicians activate a similar cognitive schema, 
this leads to the question of whether the content and actors 
are substitutes for each other in terms of their effects or 
whether they will have an interaction effect.
RQ1. Do the effects of populist messages and populist 
actors on user reactions interact?
Figure 1 summarizes the hypotheses with regard to the 
influence of the populist message and the populist actor on 
user reactions in a moderation model.
Finally, although they can all be interpreted as indicators 
of popularity or virality, different types of user reactions such 
as likes, shares, and comments can be differentiated with 
regard to their degree of activation (Berger & Milkman, 2012) 
and the user intention behind them (Bene, 2017b). Liking a 
Facebook post requires minimal action and implies the rather 
passive expression of approval, agreement, or affirmation. 
Sharing a post requires a stronger activation of users, who 
disseminate the message within their own network and may 
add an individual annotation or opinion to the original post. 
Finally, by commenting, users may voice their opinions about 
the content or source of an original post, engage in a dialogue 
with the source, or interact with other users. Thus, populist 
messages and actors may differently affect the likelihood of 
recipients liking, sharing, or commenting. Since there has not 
been much research on this, we have formulated an open 
question in this regard.
RQ2. Do populist messages and populist actors as well as 
recipients’ populist attitudes have different effects on 
users’ likelihood to like, share, and comment on a post?
Methods
Participants
Participants (N = 647) were recruited by the professional mar-
ket research company Respondi in the German-speaking part 
of Switzerland with an online access panel. They received a 
standard incentive for participation. Due to the research inter-
est, participants were asked in the beginning how often they 
use Facebook for any purpose. Participants who stated that 
they never use Facebook were excluded from the sample. Of 
the remaining 647 participants, 6.5% used Facebook less than 
monthly, 10% monthly, 19.5% weekly, 31.7% daily, and 
32.3% used Facebook several times a day. Through a quota 
procedure, we additionally aimed at a sample representative 
of the Swiss population regarding gender, age, and education. 
Women accounted for 50.9% of the participants. The partici-
pants were between 18 and 69 years old (M = 43.23, 
SD = 13.66). With regard to education, 55.8% had a university 
or college degree, 32.6% completed high school or vocational 
training, and 11.3% had only mandatory education.
Design and Procedure
The experiment was administered online in February 2019. 
The participants were informed that they will see a political 
Facebook post and will be asked questions about this post. 
However, they were not informed in advance about the cen-
tral concepts of interest in the study. After giving informed 
consent, the participants were randomly assigned to one of 
four treatment groups: (1) a populist message by a typically 
populist politician, (2) a nonpopulist message by a typically 
populist politician, (3) a populist message by a typically non-
populist politician, or (4) a nonpopulist message by a typi-
cally nonpopulist politician.
Each group was presented with a Facebook post that was 
designed for the purpose of this study. The posts consisted of 
a message arguing for a stronger control of immigration and 
a picture of a link to a nonfictitious article by the Neue 
Zürcher Zeitung on the negative long-term consequences of 
immigration. The claim (for more control of immigration) 
was consistent across all stimuli, whereas the exact wording 
and the sender of the post were adjusted according to the 
experimental manipulation.
While seeing the Facebook post, the participants were 
able to react directly to the post by using imitations of 
Facebook’s user reactions (like/reactions, share, and com-
ment). Afterward, the participants reported their intention to 
Figure 1. The influence of populist messages and populist actors 
on user reactions: a moderation model.
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like, share, or comment on the post, and their political orien-
tation, populist attitudes, and support for the promoted claim. 
Furthermore, the participants’ perceptions of populist com-
munication and the politicians’ party affiliation were assessed 
as a treatment check. Finally, the participants were thanked 
and informed about the fictitiousness of the posts and the 
purpose of the study.
Manipulation of Independent Variables
Populist versions of the post included three populist key 
messages blaming the political elite, approaching the people, 
and demanding the people’s sovereignty. These populist key 
messages were formulated based on content analyses mea-
suring populist communication in politicians’ speeches, 
social media posts, or the media (Wirth et al., 2016). A pre-
test (N = 107) using the same items as in the treatment check 
(see next section) confirmed that the populist version of the 
post was perceived to be significantly more populist than the 
nonpopulist version of the post.
Two real Swiss politicians were chosen as the senders of 
the Facebook posts. We selected two well-known official 
representatives of typically populist and nonpopulist par-
ties who are regularly present in the media. Based on a pre-
test (N = 65) assessing the image of politicians, Roger 
Köppel, a national councilor for the Swiss People’s Party 
(SVP), was chosen as the typically populist actor. As the 
typically nonpopulist politician, Gerhard Pfister, a national 
councilor and party leader of the Christian Democratic 
Party (CVP), was chosen.
Measurement of Dependent and Control 
Variables
User Reactions. While seeing the Facebook post, the partici-
pants were able to directly react to the post by clicking on 
imitations of Facebook’s popularity cues for likes, reactions 
(“love,” “wow,” “haha,” “angry,” “sad”), and shares, or by 
using a comment box. In addition, after seeing the post, the 
intention or willingness of the participants to react to the post 
was measured by three items asking them to estimate the 
likelihood that they would like, share, or comment on the 
post on a scale from 1 (very unlikely) to 5 (highly likely). As 
the dependent variable for H2a to RQ2, an index was built 
computing the mean values for the willingness to like, share, 
or comment on the post (Cronbach’s α = .791).
If the participants reported a likelihood above 3 for either 
liking, sharing, or commenting on the post, the motive behind 
this intention was asked for. The participants indicated on a 
scale from 1 (does not apply at all) to 5 (fully applies) which 
of the six to eight proposed motives applied (e.g., “by click-
ing on ‘Like’ on this Facebook post, I want to signal that I 
like the content of the post” or “by sharing this Facebook 
post, I want to show my friends that I’ve read the post”). If 
the participants reported a likelihood below 3 for liking, 
sharing, or commenting on the post, they were similarly 
asked to indicate on a scale from 1 (does not apply at all) to 
5 (fully applies) which motives applied to not reacting to the 
post (e.g., “I do not agree with the content of the post”).
Populist Messages. The main objectives were to test (1) 
whether populist actors influence the perception of the mes-
sage as containing populist elements and (2) whether popu-
list communication fosters user reactions. To test these 
hypotheses, it was essential to assess whether participants 
perceived the Facebook posts as representing populist com-
munication, that is, containing people-centrist statements, 
anti-elitist statements, or statements demanding popular sov-
ereignty. Therefore, a treatment check was implemented 
after the measurement of the dependent variables. On a scale 
from 1 (does not apply at all) to 5 (fully applies), participants 
indicated their perception of populist messages (eight items, 
for example, “The Facebook post demanded more political 
influence for the people”). An index was built by computing 
the mean values for all items (Cronbach’s α = .696).
Populist Attitudes. Populist attitudes were measured with a 
scale by Schulz, Müller, et al. (2018). The items reflected 
three subdimensions of the populist ideology: anti-elitism, 
the perceived homogeneity of the virtuous people, and a 
demand for people’s sovereignty. All items were measured 
on a scale ranging from 1 (do not agree at all) to 5 (totally 
agree). An index was built using all 12 items of the scale, 
which showed good reliability (Cronbach’s α = .846).
Party Affiliation. As an indicator of whether the participants 
recognized and correctly identified the politicians, they had 
to specify to which party they believed the politicians 
belonged. This was asked with a single-choice question with 
the five largest Swiss parties, “other” and “do not know” as 
possible answers.
Political Orientation. As a control variable, political left–right 
orientation was measured with a single item ranging from 1 
(left) to 7 (right).
Support of the Promoted Claim. The participants were asked to 
indicate how much they agreed with the central claim of the 
Facebook post that immigration to Switzerland should be 
curtailed. The participants were asked whether they agreed 
with this claim on a scale from 1 (do not agree at all) to 5 
(totally agree).
Results
Treatment Check
Before testing our hypotheses, we performed two treatment 
checks to assess participants’ perception of the experimental 
manipulation. First, we checked whether the participants 
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were familiar with the political actor and correctly identified 
his party affiliation. This was a necessary precondition for 
the experimental manipulation of the source, as the effect of 
a typically populist versus nonpopulist source can only occur 
when participants know the respective actors. Roger Köppel, 
the populist actor, was correctly identified by 71.5% of the 
sample, while Gerhard Pfister, the nonpopulist actor, was 
correctly identified by 29.3% of the sample. In the following, 
we will run analyses both based on the full sample (N = 647) 
and based only on the subset of participants who correctly 
recognized the politicians (n = 327).
Second, the perceived degree of populism in the posts 
was assessed. Neglecting the two different sources, the per-
ception of the populist messages in the populist and non-
populist posts was compared by means of an analysis of 
variance (ANOVA). The analysis revealed that the recogni-
tion of populist messages varied significantly between the 
groups and in the expected direction. Populist messages 
were recognized significantly more by the participants in 
the populist message group (M = 3.357) than by the partici-
pants in the nonpopulist message group, M = 2.948, F(2, 
647) = 69.267, p < .001, η2 = .097.
Effect of the Actor on the Perception of Populism
H1 postulates that not only the populist message but also the 
populist actor may activate a populism schema and thus 
influence the perception of a Facebook post as populist. To 
test this hypothesis, a two-factor ANOVA was conducted 
with the populist versus nonpopulist message and the popu-
list versus nonpopulist actor as independent variables and the 
index of the perception of populist messages as the depen-
dent variable. We restricted the sample to those participants 
who correctly identified the party affiliation of the political 
actor in the post (n = 327), as the manipulation of the source 
depends on the recognition of the actors (i.e., the manipula-
tion can only be effective if the participants recognize the 
actors as populist or nonpopulist). After ensuring the condi-
tion of recognition, both the content (populist message), F(2, 
327) = 35.408, p < .001, η2 = .099, and the source (populist 
actor), F(2, 327) = 10.060, p < .01, η2 = .030, have a signifi-
cant main effect, but there is no significant interaction, F(2, 
327) = 1.521, ns. As expected, the Facebook posts were per-
ceived as more populist if the message was populist or the 
source was a typically populist politician. The estimated 
marginal means analyses (see Figure 2) further show that for 
both politicians, the posts that contained populist messages 
were perceived as more populist. Furthermore, posts that did 
not contain any populist messages were perceived as signifi-
cantly more populist when the source was a populist politi-
cian. Thus, the presence of a typically populist actor as the 
source of a message contributed to the perception of popu-
lism in a message, even if the message itself did not have any 
populist elements. H1 can thus be confirmed for participants 
who were familiar with the source of the message.
Effects of Populism on User Reactions
In the next step, we investigated the effects of populist mes-
sages and populist actors as sources on user reactions to posts. 
Overall, 56.6% of participants (n = 366) clicked on at least 
one of the simulated user reactions. The most clicked was the 
“like” button with 23.5% (n = 152), followed by the “share” 
button with 11.9% (n = 77), the possibility to write a direct 
comment (10.8%, n = 70), and the reactions “angry” (10.5%, 
n = 68) and “sad” (9.1%, n = 59). Less clicked were the reac-
tions “wow” (6.8%, n = 44), “haha” (4.5%, n = 29), and “love” 
(0.3%, n = 2). The reported likelihood of interacting with the 
post was relatively low overall (M = 1.848, SE = 1.192). This 
index presents a mean value for the willingness to like, share, 
and comment.1 The willingness to “like” the post was the 
highest (M = 2.07, SE = 1.655), followed by the willingness to 
“comment” on the post (M = 1.76, SE = 1.229) and the willing-
ness to “share” the post (M = 1.71, SE = 1.340).
Figure 2. Estimated means and confidence intervals for the perception of populism for populist vs. non populist message and actor.
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To address the remaining hypotheses, a moderation model 
was computed using PROCESS (Hayes, 2018), model 2.2 As 
depicted in Figure 3, this model assesses the direct effects of 
the message (populist vs. nonpopulist), the source (populist 
vs. nonpopulist), and populist attitudes on participants’ will-
ingness to interact with the post. Furthermore, the model esti-
mates the interaction effects of the message and source and of 
both of these factors with populist attitudes. In addition, age, 
sex, political orientation, and support of the promoted claim 
were included as covariates. The variables were mean- 
centered for products, and HC3 correction was used to obtain 
heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors (Hayes & Cai, 
2007). Overall, the model explained a significant amount of 
the variance in the likelihood of interacting with the post, 
F(10, 647) = 17.38, p < .001, R2 = .26. Table 1 lists the descrip-
tive statistics for the dependent variable and the moderator.
First, the analysis estimates the effect of the populist mes-
sage compared to the nonpopulist message. There is a ten-
dency for the populist message to elicit a higher willingness 
for user reactions (b = .139, SE = 0.083, p < .1), but the effect 
is narrowly above the standard p-value threshold. Thus, H2a 
can only be supported in terms of a tendency. However, there 
was a significant interaction effect between the treatment of 
the populist message and populist attitudes on the likelihood 
of reacting to the post (b = .274, SE = 0.132, p < .05). This 
supports H2b. While there was no difference for individuals 
with low populist attitudes, individuals with high populist 
attitudes were more likely to react to the populist Facebook 
post than to the nonpopulist Facebook post (see Figure 4). In 
addition, higher populist attitudes by themselves also con-
tributed significantly to the willingness to react to the post 
(b = .319, SE = 0.072, p < .001).
Second, the model compares the effect of the populist 
actor to the nonpopulist actor as the source of the message. 
The populist actor as a source does not have a significant 
main effect (b = –.135, SE = 0.083, ns) on the likelihood of 
user reactions, and there is no significant interaction between 
the actor and populist attitudes (b = –.195, SE = 0.165, ns). 
There is also no significant interaction between the populist 
actor and the populist versus nonpopulist message (b = .035, 
Figure 3. Statistical model of the moderation (based on Hayes, 2018).
Table 1. Descriptive statistics of the dependent variable and moderator of the four experimental groups.
Populist actor Nonpopulist actor
 Populist message 
(n = 159)
Nonpopulist message 
(n = 167)
Populist message 
(n = 161)
Nonpopulist message 
(n = 160)
 M SD M SD M SD M SD
User reactions 1.80 1.26 1.79 1.13 2.04 1.32 1.76 1.01
Populist attitudes 3.37 0.66 3.37 0.67 3.34 0.68 3.38 0.73
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SE = 0.044, ns). However, as argued above, the recognition of 
the political actor is crucial for triggering a cognitive schema.
Therefore, we restricted the sample to those participants 
who correctly identified the party affiliation of the two politi-
cians (n = 327) and tested the same moderation model. Again, 
the model was significant overall, F(10, 327) = 9.12, p < .001, 
R2 = .29. With the restricted sample, the main effects of the 
populist actor and the interaction with populist attitudes 
remain nonsignificant. However, we find a tendency toward 
a negative interaction between the populist message and the 
populist actor (b = –.491, SE = 0.269, p = .069). Thus, the dif-
ference between populist and nonpopulist messages seems to 
be larger for the nonpopulist actor than for the typically pop-
ulist actor (see Figure 5). Therefore, H3a and H3b must be 
rejected, and this rather unexpected result with regard to 
RQ1 will be addressed in the “Discussion” section.
With regard to the control variables, political orientation 
(b = .178, SE = 0.064, p < .01) and support for the claim 
(b = .164, SE = 0.062, p < .01) have a positive effect on the 
likelihood of reacting to the posts. This means that partici-
pants were more willing to react to the Facebook post when 
they were more right wing and more supportive of a stronger 
control of immigration.
In the final step, to answer RQ2, we tested the moderation 
model for the intentions to like, share, or comment on the 
posts separately and found interesting differences for the dif-
ferent types of user reactions. For the intention to like the 
Facebook post as the dependent variable, there are no signifi-
cant effects of the populist message, populist actor, populist 
attitudes, and no significant interactions. The likelihood to 
like the Facebook post was, however, higher for individuals 
who had a more right-wing political orientation (b = .267, 
SE = 0.077, p < .001) and who supported the claim of the 
posts (b = .362, SE = 0.078, p < .001). For the intention to 
share the Facebook post, we find a significant effect of 
populist attitudes (b = .402, SE = 0.177, p < .05), a tendency 
for populist messages (b = .242, SE = 0.132, p = .067), and a 
significant interaction between populist messages and popu-
list attitudes (b = .418, SE = 0.209, p < .05). However, there 
were no significant main effects or interactions with regard 
to the populist actor. Finally, for the intention to comment on 
the post as the dependent variable, we again find a rather 
unexpected significant negative interaction between the pop-
ulist message and the source of the message (b = –.673, 
SE = 0.298, p < .05). Participants were more willing to com-
ment on the populist post if it was by the typically nonpopu-
list politician.
These differences in the results may be partly explained 
by the different motives behind the willingness to like, share, 
or comment on a Facebook post. For those who indicated 
that they would probably like the post (willingness > 3), the 
three most important motives were to signal that they agree 
with the source of the post (M = 4.28, SE = 0.919), share the 
views of the politician (M = 4.23, SE = 0.867), or like the con-
tent of the post (M = 4.20, SE = 0.958). For those who indi-
cated that they would probably share the post (willingness > 3), 
the most important motives were to show that they share the 
views of the politician (M = 4.13, SE = 1.141), that they agree 
with the source of the post (M = 4.07, SE = 1.174), and that 
they would want their friends to also read this post (M = 4.02, 
SE = 1.122). The most common motives to comment on the 
post (willingness > 3) were on one hand, similar to liking and 
sharing, to show that they share the views of the politician 
(M = 3.25, SE = 1.547) and to express agreement with the 
content of the post (M = 3.24, SE = 1.516). On the other hand, 
another common motive for commenting was to criticize the 
content of the post (M = 3.28, SE = 1.466). In contrast, partici-
pants who reported that they would probably not like, share, 
or comment on the post mostly reported that they generally 
do not like, share, or comment on any political content 
Figure 4. Interaction effect of the populist message and populist 
attitudes on user reactions.
Figure 5. Interaction effect of the populist vs. nonpopulist 
message and the populist vs. nonpopulist actor on user reactions.
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(M = 3.78, SE = 1.377), do not share the politician’s views 
(M = 3.39, SE = 1.486), or do not agree with the source of the 
content (M = 3.33, SE = 1.499).
Discussion and Conclusion
The aim of this study was, first, to examine whether a typi-
cally populist actor elicits a populism schema similar to pop-
ulist messages and how these two factors—content and 
source—interact. Adding to previous research on populist 
communication, we tested whether the perception of populist 
messages differs for typically populist and nonpopulist poli-
ticians. As expected, Facebook posts that did not include 
populist messages were nevertheless perceived as populist if 
the source was recognized as a typically populist politician. 
Thus, our study confirms that communication by populist 
actors can elicit a populism schema, even if the particular 
message does not contain populist elements (H1). The sec-
ond objective of this study was to test the widespread 
assumption that populist messages and populist actors are 
more likely to trigger user reactions on SNS. As expected, 
the effect of populist messages on user reactions was moder-
ated by populist attitudes. Recipients were more likely to 
react to a populist message than a nonpopulist message but 
only if they had high populist attitudes. Hence, H2b was sup-
ported and H2a only in terms of a tendency.
In contrast, the expectation that user reactions would also 
be fostered by a typically populist politician (H3a), espe-
cially for participants with high populist attitudes (H3b), was 
not supported. Although the presence of a populist actor as 
the source of the message increased the perception of the 
message as representing populist communication, this did 
not affect participants’ likelihood to interact with the post. 
Our results thus suggest that user reactions are driven more 
by the message than by the actor sending the message. 
Furthermore, there was a negative interaction between the 
populist actor and populist messages for those participants 
who recognized the actors (RQ1). On one hand, these find-
ings might be influenced by the specific actors chosen for 
this study. On the other hand, the findings may at least in part 
be explained by looking at the three main types of popularity 
cues on Facebook separately (RQ2).
For likes, we did not find an effect of populist communi-
cation or the populist actor. Rather, participants were more 
willing to like the post if they agreed with the message’s 
main claim. This could be explained by the fact that liking a 
post requires a lower degree of activation and may be a rather 
habitual or an automatic response (Alhabash et al., 2019). 
For shares, we found the expected interaction effect of popu-
list messages and populist attitudes. Participants were more 
likely to share populist Facebook posts, especially if they 
had high populist attitudes. Finally, for comments, we found 
a negative interaction between populist communication and 
the actor; recipients were more likely to comment on popu-
list messages if they came from the nonpopulist actor. We 
can only speculate about the reasons behind this. Comments 
were driven by both approval and rejection of the message. It 
may be that the “surprising” use of populist communication 
by nonpopulist actors leads to more comments, be they affir-
mative or negative. The unexpected use of populist messages 
by a moderate politician could on one hand give recipients 
with high populist attitudes the impression that their views 
have arrived in mainstream politics. On the other hand, it 
could also elicit a certain “backlash” effect (see also 
Hameleers & Schmuck, 2017) by recipients who do not sup-
port populist ideas. Future research should investigate the 
motives for commenting on populist posts in more detail.
Of course, this study does not come without limitations. 
First, we chose specific political actors and a specific issue 
for the Facebook posts. Immigration as a topic was chosen 
because it has been identified as one of the central drivers of 
populism in Western Europe (Salgado et al., 2019; Stanyer 
et al., 2019; Taggart, 2017). It remains a question for future 
research whether Facebook posts on other issues, especially 
left-wing issues, elicit the same effects on user reactions. 
However, this focus allowed for better internal and external 
validity. Whereas the SVP in Switzerland is widely identified 
as a typically populist right-wing party, there is no equivalent 
populist left-wing party that could be expected to elicit a 
similarly strong populism schema. Although we chose prom-
inent politicians who are both often featured in the media, 
only approximately half of the participants could correctly 
identify their party affiliation. Specifically, the nonpopulist 
actor was less known, despite being the leader of the fourth-
largest party in Switzerland. This may be explained by the 
federalist political system of Switzerland. Nevertheless, we 
would expect stronger effects for more well-known political 
actors, and future research could include multiple actors to 
generate more robust findings.
Second, participants in this study were presented with an 
isolated Facebook post in an experimental context, and we 
measured their self-reported willingness to interact with this 
post. Actual behavior in a real-world setting might differ from 
this hypothetical situation. On one hand, reactions may be 
overestimated in the experiment, as individuals know about 
the anonymity of the situation, which is not given in the real-
world context. On the other hand, reactions may also be under-
estimated in an artificial setting due to social desirability and 
due to the fact that generally only a small, highly active, and 
motivated proportion of the public shares or comments on 
political content online (Newman et al., 2016). In comparison 
to content analyses on user reactions, this is a disadvantage, 
but only an experimental setting allows the controlling of par-
ticipants’ populist attitudes. Furthermore, it also allows for 
including participants in the study who would not interact with 
a Facebook post, who cannot be accounted for in content anal-
yses. Therefore, content analyses and experiments on this 
topic should be seen as ideal complements to each other.
Third, we only measured effects of populist messages on 
a very specific and limited form of intended behavior, namely 
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on the use of reactions on Facebook. The activation of a pop-
ulism schema and the perception of the people as a deprived 
in-group and the elites as an out-group threat may have addi-
tional consequences on other online and offline behavior that 
we cannot assess within our study. Future research should 
investigate whether populist messages has effects on other 
types of intended or manifest political engagement, and 
whether these effects are similarly moderated by citizens’ 
populist attitudes.
Fourth, the perceptions of populism in the posts cluster 
around the middle response on the scale. This may indicate 
that the populist stimuli were perceived as only “mildly” 
populist, while the nonpopulist stimuli were also perceived 
as somewhat populist. This may have several reasons: First, 
one group within the nonpopulist treatment had a populist 
actor as the source of the message, which, as we show, 
enhances the perception of the posts being populist. Second, 
also the issue of the newspaper article or the political claim 
that was made may be perceived as populist. Furthermore, 
the scale we employed to measure the perception of populist 
communication in a post was not designed to measure an 
absolute level of perceptions of populism, but to compare 
these perceptions between the experimental groups. As the 
populist posts were perceived to be populist, and the differ-
ence between the experimental groups is significant and has 
a medium effect size, we can conclude that the experimental 
manipulation was successful. Nevertheless, future research 
could aim to find stimuli that are perceived more/less popu-
list for the respective conditions.
To summarize, this study demonstrates that the effect of 
populist communication on user reactions on SNS seems to 
be moderated by recipients’ populist attitudes but that the 
effect also depends on the sender as well as the type of user 
reaction. It relies on a nonstudent sample, and the partici-
pants are representative of the Swiss population with regard 
to gender, age, and education. Overall, this study contributes 
to research on populist communication in two ways. First, it 
shows that not only populist messages but also typically pop-
ulist actors may activate a populism schema. While content 
analyses have found that populist communication is a rather 
limited and fragmented phenomenon in the media (Hameleers 
et al., 2017a; Müller et al., 2017) and on SNS (Ernst et al., 
2017), this finding indicates that the perceived amount of 
populist communication may be much higher. Second, the 
study complements existing content analyses by demonstrat-
ing that the effect of populist communication on user reac-
tions is moderated by recipients’ populist attitudes. Thus, 
although populist communication may contribute to a higher 
reach or popularity on SNS, this is dependent on the charac-
teristics of the politicians’ followers.
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Notes
1. As an example, a participant who reacted with a like to the post 
may have indicated that they would be very much willing to 
like the post (5) but not at all willing to share (1) or comment 
(1), which would then result in a mean value of 2.3.
2. In contrast to Hayes’s (2018) basic statistical model 2, an addi-
tional interaction term between the two moderators, populist 
actor and populist attitudes, was added.
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